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“Old George Orwell got it backward. Big Brother isn't watching. He's singing and 
dancing. He's pulling rabbits out of a hat. Big Brother’s busy holding your attention every 
moment you're awake. He's making sure you're always distracted. He's making sure 
you're fully absorbed.”   
Chuck Palahniuk (2002), in Lullaby 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is entirely appropriate that the study of public finance take seriously “behavioral” 
inconsistencies with traditional models of individual and collective decision-making.  A 
central tension in political economy—the extent to which people need to be protected 
from the state versus whether the state is needed to protect people from each other and 
the vicissitudes of life—takes on new dimensions once one recognizes that people often 
act irrationally and in ways that are contrary to their own long-term interests, and are 
cognitively bounded.  This raises the question of whether the state should play a role in 
protecting individuals from themselves, and whether individuals are susceptible to 
manipulation, or even exploitation, by the people who comprise the state. 
In this essay I address one aspect of this issue—how it affects an economic analysis 
of tax systems.  In addressing this task I ask, and offer some tentative answers to, what is 
distinctive about behavioral tax economics as a sub-field of behavioral economics and as 
a sub-field of tax economics.  In his review of behavioral economics, Camerer (2006, p. 
196) refers to the “franchising” of behavioral economics into sub-fields, listing finance, 
labor economics, and public finance as notable examples, but he does not elaborate on the 
distinctive problems that the public finance franchise must confront.  The papers 
collected in McCaffery and Slemrod (2006) address some of these questions, and 
Kirchler (2007) provides a nice overview of some as well.  In this essay I offer some 
thoughts on two of these distinctive problems.  The first is tax complexity and how it 
relates to the framing of the fiscal environment and the bounded rationality of taxpayers 
and citizen-voters.  The second is tax compliance and the roles played by altruism and 
reciprocity. 
 
2.  Tax Complexity   2
Observers of tax systems have noted that many tax systems are extraordinarily 
complicated, although the standard for judging excess is generally not made explicit.  
Consider the U.S. income tax.  The resource cost of collecting income taxes—including 
both the administrative cost and compliance cost—has been estimated to be about 10 
percent of revenue collected.
1  In 2005 the number of words in the federal income tax 
code was 1,286,000, and 5,778,000 words in federal tax regulations.
2  In tax year 2006 62 
percent of individual income taxpayers paid someone to help them file; 72 percent did so 
in Australia. 
Tax complexity can affect the private decisions made by taxpayers, as well as the 
voting and other social choice behavior of citizens.  Each of these issues has been 
recognized, although the connection between the two has not been given much attention.   
 
Taxpayers as Decision Makers 
Accurately calculating one’s tax liability in self-assessment income tax systems is 
difficult for many taxpayers.  To be sure, this is heterogeneous.  People differ in their 
cognitive ability, and the cognitive (and energy) process requirements of tax compliance 
vary greatly across taxpayers.  For those with complicated financial affairs, especially 
with respect to capital income, it can be very difficult.  For those whose income is mostly 
wages and salary, the process can be very straightforward.     
Calculating one’s tax liability is tantamount to calculating the distance between a 
pre-tax budget line and a post-tax budget line at a given set of choices about labor supply 
and consumption basket.  Of more interest to economists, though, is how complexity 
affects individuals’ perceptions of the whole budget set, and in particular the (relative) 
prices as reflected by its gradients. 
There is a long strand of research about taxpayer perceptions of their average and 
marginal tax rate, a component of some central relative prices such as between labor and 
leisure.  Sheffrin (1994) reviews studies of American, British, and Canadian taxpayers 
that find that taxpayers generally underestimate both their total and marginal tax rates.  
What is not clear is the connection between knowledge of one’s marginal tax rate and the 
                                                 
1 See Slemrod (2004) for the source of this figure. 
2 http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/1961.html, accessed on April 7, 2009.   3
complexity of the tax system.  One hypothesis is offered by Liebman and Zeckhauser 
(2004), who suggest that, because of cognitive limitations, taxpayers presume that their 
marginal tax rate is the easier-to-calculate average tax rate; they call this rule of thumb 
behavior “ironing,” one of two examples of what they dub “schmeduling,” defined as    
an inaccurately perceived price schedule.  They show that ironing behavior eliminates 
some of the deadweight loss from high marginal taxes, so that when the optimal tax 
schedule with non-ironing taxpayers would be convex, superior outcomes are available.  
An analysis of the introduction in 1998 of the child care credit uncovers evidence that is 
consistent with scheduling, but is not conclusive. 
That taxpayers have cognitive limitations has many implications for tax analysis.  
One is that the distribution of tax burden may depend on, in addition to the intended 
characteristics, cognitive ability.  Another is that taxpayers who are not so good at 
addressing tax matters may avoid certain employment status, such as self-employment, 
that require or reward this kind of savvy.  Finally, some equivalences taken for granted 
by tax theory—for example, that between a labor income tax and a consumption tax—
may not obtain because they are perceived differently.
3  Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganun 
(2008) find, in an experimental setting, that subjects reduce their labor supply 
significantly more in response to an income tax than they do in response to an equivalent 
consumption tax, and speculate that this occurs because subjects underestimate the 
present value of the taxes levied on future consumption.  Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) 
show that, in an experimental setting, buyers systematically underestimate the tax burden 
of an indirect tax levied on sellers but do not do so with an equivalent direct tax. 
I believe that the public finance community need to give more thought to the 
appropriate econometric methodology for measuring taxpayer responses to fiscal 
instruments in the presence of cognitive biases and rules of thumb that economize on 
cognitive resources.  A first but necessary step is to understand how taxpayers map these 
instruments into relative prices.  This step includes, but is not limited to, understanding 
which changes are ignored as not salient, possibly because rules of thumb conserve 
cognitive resources and focus only on changes above a certain level of materiality.  The 
                                                 
3 The textbook equivalences may also fail because of differences in the administrative and compliance 
costs.  See Slemrod (2008a).   4
burgeoning literature on salience and taxation has not, though, yet been placed in an 
adequate dynamic context; after all, a series of small tax changes, each ignored, can add 
up to a major displacement from an optimal choice.
4   
 
Taxpayers as Voters 
Adult consumers are also potential voters, and as such must decide which 
candidates’ tax positions to favor, including how complex they should be.  In their role as 
voters they are confronted by the difficulty of figuring out what the consequences of 
alternative tax policies are, both for themselves and for aggregate economic outcomes.   
Some context is appropriate.  Political science research is fairly persuasive that 
voters know very little about the details of government generally.  Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1996), in a comprehensive survey of the political knowledge of voters covering 
several decades and hundreds of surveys, show that majorities of voters are ignorant of 
many key aspects of the U.S. political system, such as who has the power to declare war, 
the respective functions of the three branches of government, and who controls monetary 
policy. In contrast, the policy implications of this lack of political knowledge are highly 
controversial among political scientists.  For example, Lupia (2001) argues that political 
knowledge, as commonly measured by scales that count the number of correct responses 
to a small number of questions about public affairs, represent neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for voter competence in making choices, where a choice is defined 
to be competent if it is the same choice that would be made given the most accurate 
information about its consequences. There is little systematic evidence that voters are 
misled to support policies that are almost certainly not in their interest, although Slemrod 
(2006) argues that this is the case with respect to Americans’ support for a flat income 
tax: because many (mistakenly) believe the current U.S. income tax system is regressive, 
they view, and support, the move to a flat tax as a move toward a more progressive 
distribution of the tax burden. 
Why some jurisdictions’ tax systems, or to be exact some taxes levied in some 
jurisdictions, become complex while others do not has not been widely studied, hampered 
by the absence of reliable, comparable measures of complexity across countries.  Slemrod 
                                                 
4 See Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007).   5
(2005) uses the variation in U.S. state income tax systems, and their differential change 
over time, 
 to examine what engenders tax complexity, measured simply by the number
 of 
lines in the tax forms and the number of pages in the instruction
 booklets, and reveals 
some intriguing patterns.  The analysis shows that, in 2000, states with more
 professional 
legislatures, as measured by the salaries paid,
 tended to have more complex tax systems, 
as did states with a less
 active voting population.  The former relationship suggests that 
complexity is one of the things that professional legislatures do, although it may also be 
that states that want more activist policy want professional legislatures and choose more 
complex tax systems.  The latter relationship suggests that a more politically involved 
citizenry acts as a deterrent to tax complexity. 
Professional economists cannot be too smug about voter confusion, of course, 
because there is much we do not understand ourselves in all areas of economics, with the 
economics of taxation being no exception.  Central questions such as the incidence of the 
corporate tax and deficit financing, and the long-term growth implications of alternative 
tax systems, are unresolved and controversial.   
Politicians have an incentive and often the ability to take advantage of taxpayers’ 
behavioral quirks and cognitive limitations.
5  McCaffery (1993) and Krishna and Slemrod 
(2003) argue that the U.S. income tax has many features that take advantage of cognitive 
biases to reduce the perceived tax burden, and do so by applying well-known features of 
what in marketing science is known as “price presentation,” such as the use of discounts 
(as in deductions from a broad measure of income) and of small frequent disbursements 
(as in employer withholding).
6   The laboratory experiments of Baron and McCaffery 
(2003) provide some support that such a strategy can be successful, as they demonstrate 
that people tend to underestimate the total tax burden when it is spread among multiple 
taxes.  The concern that some taxes, such as the value added tax or corporation income 
tax, are “hidden” from taxpayers is a major reason why some conservatives oppose these 
taxes: they feel that the hiddenness causes voters to underestimate the true cost of 
                                                 
5 To be sure, there are other explanations for tax complexity.  Hettich and Winer (1999) argue that complex 
tax structures emerge as a by-product of the struggle for political office, in the course of which political 
parties are forced to propose and implement policies that discriminate or distinguish as carefully as possible 
among heterogeneous voters.  In their view it is administrative costs that limit the desire of governments to 
discriminate fully among taxpayers.   
6 Kim and Kachersky (2006) critically review the marketing science literature on price salience.   6
government.  As an example, Finkelstein (2007) argues that the switch from manual, per-
trip, remittance of traffic tolls to automatic electronic charging facilitated toll increases 
because the act of remittance became less salient to driver/voters. 
The analogy of tax design to price presentation raises the issue of what is different 
between the public finance setting and a market environment.  Although in democracies 
there is some degree of political competition, it seems likely that in social choices the 
intermediation of the market is less relevant, whereas in many cases involving behavioral 
economics, markets might plausibly arbitrage away, or exploit, irrationalities.  But even 
this is not obvious.  As Mullainathan and Thaler (2001) emphasize, many decisions, such 
as with regard to retirement savings, are made infrequently and so learning by doing is 
not likely to be very important; less-than-rational people “survive” and influence market 
outcomes. 
Scitovsky (1950) observed sixty years ago that ignorance can be a source of 
oligopoly power because it limits price and quality competition among established firms 
and protects them from potential entry, thus facilitating collusion among established 
firms.  Garrod (2007) remarks that obfuscation is widespread in several markets 
including, somewhat surprisingly, Internet retailing, and retail financial products such as 
index funds, money market funds, credit cards, conventional fixed-rate mortgages, life 
annuities, and term life insurance.  Indeed, recent theoretical research has shown how 
even competitive markets might not drive out private firms’ obfuscation about prices.  As 
a baseline, Milgrom (1981) had shown that, if consumers have the cognitive ability to 
infer that they should avoid firms with hidden information, then competing firms will 
fully inform consumers of product information if it is feasible and costless.  But a more 
recent literature has established that obfuscation can be profitable in equilibrium with 
competitive constraints.  For example, in the “shrouded attributes equilibrium” of Gabaix 
and Laibson (2006), firms can obfuscate their prices for a complementary, avoidable add-
on to a good, and may optimally do so when there are a sufficient fraction of consumers 
that myopically do not consider the add-on.  Of particular interest for the topic at hand is   7
the result that in equilibrium the sophisticated consumers actually benefit by taking 
advantage of the lower price for the basic good and not purchasing the add-ons.
7   
One take-away from this literature is that firms may benefit from complicating, or 
obfuscating, the available information and that this process may benefit sophisticated 
consumers at the expense of unsophisticated ones.  I have argued that the people in the 
incumbent government may try to, and may be able to, take advantage of framing 
difficulties to benefit themselves by reducing the perceived burden of what they do.  In 
the process the more sophisticated of taxpayers may actually benefit.  But the people in 
the government are also “just” people, and so may themselves be subject to framing 
issues.  One important and understudied issue is how to model the behavior of policy 
makers subject to cognitive limitations: are they subject to the same kind of heuristic 
biases as taxpayers/voters?   
 
  3.  Tax Compliance  
Once a tax system is in place, influenced by the voting decisions of citizens, then 
these same citizens must decide whether and to what extent to comply with the tax rules 
in place.  Can the psychology of attitudes toward authority inform the question of 
whether taxpayers generally free ride, or under some circumstances look beyond their 
cost-benefit calculus of risk and reward to be influenced by, for example, the fairness of 
the distribution of tax burden and the process that determines the burden?
8   Camerer 
(2006, p. 9) places this issue squarely within the realm of behavioral economics, 
remarking that “the idea that people care only about their own monetary or goods payoff 
is not a central tenet of rational choice theory, but it is a common simplifying 
assumption.” 
                                                 
7 Carlin (2009) generalizes the standard assumption in this literature that the fraction of uninformed 
consumers is constant, and allows that firms may influence how informed the consumer population is by 
affecting the quality of information they are given;  in this model an increase in competitive pressure 
generates an increase in price complexity.  Garrod (2007) discusses other models that address how firms 
strategically set prices in equilibrium in response to the shortcomings of their consumer population.   
8 Of course, behavioral game theory may also apply to the strategic interaction between a taxpayer (and 
perhaps a professional tax preparer) and government auditors.  For example, Slemrod, Blumenthal, and 
Christian (2001) found in a field experiment that sophisticated, high-income taxpayers report less taxable 
income when informed their tax return would be audited; one explanation is that the taxpayers understand 
that an audit is a negotiation in which the auditor has imperfect information, and that in such a negotiation a 
low initial bid (i.e., a low reported income) may be part of an optimal strategy.   8
 
Beyond Deterrence 
Although the deterrence framework introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
has dominated the economics literature addressing tax evasion, some have argued that it 
misses important elements of the tax evasion decision because it predicts a compliance 
rate much lower than what we actually observe.  For example, Feld and Frey (2002, p. 5) 
assert that it is "impossible to account for tax compliance in terms of expected 
punishment."  The dismissive argument goes as follows: given the low average 
probability of audit (in the United States recently less than 1 percent for individual 
returns with no business income), the low penalties generally assessed for noncompliance 
(typically 10 percent of the amount underpaid), and what we know about the degree of 
risk aversion from other contexts, noncompliance should be much higher than it 
apparently is.  
But this dismissive argument is not persuasive, because the low average audit 
coverage rate vastly understates the chances that the average dollar of unreported net 
income would be detected.  A wage or salary earner whose employer submits the 
employee’s taxable income and Social Security number electronically to the Internal 
Revenue Service, but who does not report that income on his own personal return, will be 
flagged for further scrutiny with a probability much closer to 100 percent than to 1 
percent.  Thus, the low rates of noncompliance for labor income (about 1 percent) 
calculated as part of the IRS tax gap study (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005) by no 
means patently contradict the deterrence theory.  Whether the 57 percent noncompliance 
rate of non-farm sole proprietors the IRS calculates is less than the deterrence theory 
predicts is less clear, and Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998, pp. 821-822) argue that it 
is. 
  Nonetheless, there is considerable experimental (and anecdotal) evidence that 
there is more to the story of tax evasion than an amoral cost-benefit calculation.  Frey 
(1997) argues that it is important to differentiate between the intrinsic motivation under 
which taxpayers comply with tax liabilities because of “civic virtue” and extrinsic 
motivation in which they pay because of threat of punishment. He suggests that 
increasing extrinsic motivation—say with more punitive enforcement policies—may   9
“crowd out” intrinsic motivation by making people feel that they pay taxes because they 
have to, rather than because they want to. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) argue that this 
explains why parent tardiness increased after an Israeli day care center instituted 
monetary fines for late pick-up of children.  In an experimental setting, Scholz and Lubell 
(2001) find that the level of cooperation in certain settings declines significantly when 
penalties are introduced, suggesting that the increased level of deterrence did not 
compensate for the change in how people frame their decision brought about by the 
higher penalties.   
  Some laboratory experiments have found that subjects respond not only to the 
probabilities and stakes of a tax evasion game, but also to the context provided to them, 
as in Spicer and Becker (1980) and Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992).
9 Alm, Jackson, 
and McKee (1993) found that (1) experimental subjects are willing to pay more in taxes 
when they first choose the use of their taxes by voting than when the identical use is 
imposed upon them, (2) compliance is somewhat greater when the vote is decisive 
compared to when the vote is close, and (3) tax compliance is significantly lowered by 
the imposition of an unpopular program.  
It may be that tax evasion decisions depend on perceptions of the fairness of the 
tax system.  If, the argument goes, perceived tax equity strengthens the social norm 
against evasion, then evasion becomes more costly in terms of bad conscience (if not 
caught) or bad reputation (if caught). Note also that an individual may find unfairness in 
what the government uses tax revenues for—a person with some of the spirit of Henry 
David Thoreau may avoid taxes because that person thinks government (non-tax) policy 
wrong (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998).  But such individual judgments can be 
complex; for example, expenditures on warfare might contribute to a sense of fairness 
tolerated in a patriotic period, but rejected during another period characterized by anti-
militarism.
10 
  These patterns suggest that a form of reciprocal altruism may be at work, in which 
the taxpayer’s behavior depends on the behavior, motivations, and intentions not of any 
subset of particular individuals, but of the government itself.  Levi (1997, p. 91) argues 
                                                 
9 Alm and Jacobson (2007) critically review the use of laboratory experiments in public economics. 
10 This argument is made by Daunton (1998).    10
that when citizens believe that the government will act in their interests, that its 
procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and others is reciprocated, then people 
are more likely to become “contingent consenters” who cooperate in paying taxes even 
when their short-term material interest would make free riding the individual’s best 
option.  Some survey evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Torgler (2003) and 
Slemrod (2003) show there is a positive relationship across countries between survey-
based attitudes toward tax evasion on the one hand and professed trust in government, 
and Slemrod (2003) finds that the same relationship holds across individuals within the 
United States and Germany.  Of course attitudes and actions are not the same.
11  A 2002 
poll in the Czech Republic indicated that a person would be more likely to evade taxes if 
that person believed government services were substandard (Hanousek and Palda, 2004).  
None of these studies, though, establishes a causal connection between the two attitudes, 
and some of the observed correlation might be due to an ex post rationalization of tax-
noncompliant behavior. 
If perceptions matter for tax compliance, a natural question is to what extent tax 
compliance behavior can be manipulated by the government to lower the cost of raising 
resources.  Appeals to conscience go back at least to Hammurabi’s reign in ancient 
Babylon, when the tax collector sent the following notice when payments were late:  
“Why have you not sent to Babylon the 30 lambs as your tax?  Are you not ashamed of 
such behavior?”
12  Wartime appeals to patriotism to induce citizens to pay their taxes 
(and, often, buy war bonds) are common; the U.S. Secretary of Treasury during World 
War I, William Gibbs McAdoo, referred to these campaigns as “capitalizing patriotism.”  
Kang and Rockoff (2006) discuss the World War I experience, while Jones (1988/1989) 
discusses fiscal propaganda during World War II.  Feldman and Slemrod (forthcoming), 
using cross-country data on interstate conflicts from 1970 to the present and on attitudes 
toward tax evasion from the World Values Survey, find that positive attitudes towards tax 
compliance increase with the number and length of conflicts that a country faces, but 
decrease in the number of fatalities incurred in these conflicts. Konrad and Qari (2009) 
                                                 
11 Kirchler (2007, p. 55) concludes from a  review of the literature that most studies find a statistically 
significant, but weaker, relationship between attitudes and self-reported behavior, and goes on to suggest 
that this implies that the relationship between attitudes and actual behavior “is expected to be even 
weaker.” 
12 This quotation is cited in Webber and Wildavsky (1986, p. 58).     11
find a positive cross-country and within-country correlation between professed patriotism 
and tax compliance attitudes, although it is difficult to establish causality with their data. 
That such campaigns are successful during ordinary (non-war) times in swaying 
taxpayers from their Allingham and Sandmo (1972) optimal compliance strategy has not 
been compellingly demonstrated.  In a randomized field experiment with Minnesota 
taxpayers in a peacetime setting, Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (2001) find no 
evidence that either of two written appeals to taxpayers’ consciences had a significant 
effect on compliance.  One letter stressed the beneficial effects of tax-funded projects, 
while the other conveyed the message that most taxpayers were compliant.  Torgler 
(2004), using a controlled field experiment in Switzerland, also found that moral suasion 
had hardly any effect on taxpayers’ compliance behavior.  Fellner, Sausgruber, and 
Traxler (2009) find that similar written appeals had no discernible impact on compliance 
with Austrian television registration fees. 
Survey evidence also suggests that attitudes about the acceptability of tax evasion 
vary considerably across countries.  In the World Values Surveys done between 1999 and 
2002, respondents were asked whether, given the chance, tax evasion is never, 
sometimes, or always justified, where a value of 1 corresponds to “never justifiable” and 
a value of 10 corresponds to “always justifiable.”  These attitude measures of the World 
Values Survey across countries are associated, holding other factors constant, with 
already-discussed measures of the shadow economy and widely used survey measures of 
actual evasion (Torgler, 2004).  But, again, attitudes are not behavior. 
The difficulties of separating out whether people pay their taxes because they feel 
they “ought to” or whether they fear the penalties attendant to not doing so is well 
illustrated by some evidence from a recent survey sponsored by the Internal Revenue 
Service Oversight Board (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2006).  While 96 percent of 
those surveyed in 2005 mostly or completely agreed that “It is every American’s civic 
duty to pay their fair share of taxes,” 62 percent also said that “fear of an audit” had a 
great deal or somewhat of an influence on whether they report and pay their taxes 
“honestly.” 
Behavioral game theory and laboratory experiments may shed some light on the 
conditions under which taxpayers may be willing to deviate from their Allingham-  12
Sandmo optimal level of evasion.  For example, much research about the ultimatum game 
suggests that people are willing to take costly actions that express their concerns for 
fairness.  Many people express “negative reciprocity,” meaning that they will take actions 
that lower the welfare of the person who treated them in a way that they perceive to be 
unfair, and will do so at a cost to themselves.  The experimental results reported in Blount 
(1995) suggest that beliefs about what motivated another person and judging the 
appropriateness of the motives, their “intentionality,” is critical to explaining behavior 
toward that person.  According to Cooper and Kagel (2009, p. 49), the Blount result 
“makes it completely obvious why outcome-based preferences are not enough.”
13   
Some observers have interpreted behavior reflecting intentionality as the vestigial 
expression of a behavior that had survival value in a setting where the same people 
interacted with the same people in a small group.  Also of interest is the laboratory result 
that inducing a sense of entitlement, by allowing ultimatum game proposer to be the 
winner of a contest, lowers offers; the sense of entitlement leads people to give away less 
of what is theirs.  Ultimatum games with multiple players suggest that responders care 
about whether proposers are unfair to them, but do not care much about how the proposer 
treats others.  This is an important distinction for understanding individuals’ attitudes 
toward government, because government policies do not generally single out particular 
individuals other than through enforcement actions, but may single out groups of people 
defined by income, geography, demographics, tastes, or choices. 
Note also that the concern for fairness that is evident in two-player games tends to 
disappear in large markets, where even those who care about fairness behave self-
interestedly either because they are not sure whether others are being fair or they cannot 
easily punish those that are acting unfairly.  As Camerer (2006) remarks, “a competitive 
market is simply a place in which it is hard to express your concern for fairness.”  It is 
indeed hard, but not impossible.  Consumer boycotts date back as far as the fourteenth 
                                                 
13 The distinction is nicely illustrated by a famous interchange in Joseph Heller’s novel, Catch-22, between 
the protagonist John Yossarian, an Army Air Force bombardier, and another member of the bomb crew, the 
naïve Clevinger:  
"They're trying to kill me," Yossarian told him calmly.  
"No one's trying to kill you," Clevinger cried.  
"Then why are they shooting at me?" Yossarian asked.  
"They're shooting at everyone," Clevinger answered. "They're trying to kill everyone."  
"And what difference does that make?"   13
century, and have had both sociopolitical objectives (as with the U.S. civil rights bus 
boycotts) and objectives of changing corporate practices (as with the Nike boycott 
designed to stop their use of “sweatshop” labor). 
There is an active controversy about what exactly fairness means.  Is it an aversion 
to inequality, where people dislike both getting less than a fair share and getting more 
than a fair share?  Or is a concern for reciprocity, where how people feel about others 
depends on how they expect to be treated?  As mentioned, the research suggests that 
people care about the intentions of other players.  The laboratory experiment described in 
List (2007) suggests that the results of a dictator game also depend on whether the 
identical terms are framed as giving or taking. 
 
The Psychology of Authority 
  What we know little about is to what extent the psychological dynamics of 
individuals’ relations with other individuals may be different than the psychological 
dynamics of individuals versus an agency of the government.  For example, there is 
evidence from laboratory experiments that many people are willing to reciprocate what 
they perceive to be kindness in other individuals, and to not reciprocate – or even punish 
– perceived meanness in others.  But how do individuals ascribe human qualities like 
kindness or meanness to a government?  For example, do such feelings change with a 
change of government?  Certainly we should be sensitive to an “anthropomorphic 
fallacy” of attributing human thoughts and emotions to inanimate objects or animals.  
  Here again we may learn by looking at similar situations.  Although government 
is not exactly like any other organization or institution—in particular, it has a monopoly 
on coercive power, including the power to tax—government is not the only organization 
or institution that individuals interact with.  For example, people interact on a regular 
basis as employees and customers with firms, some of which are as large as some 
governments.  As employees they have to decide whether to give maximal effort or slack 
off, whether to pilfer or even embezzle.  Indeed, in his survey of behavioral economics, 
Camerer (2006, p. 177) asks whether angry workers consider “management to be a single 
monolithic player and get angry the same way that they get angry at a spouse who 
threatens to leave them or a driver who cuts them off on the LA Freeway.”  As   14
customers, people have to make decisions about shoplifting, insurance fraud, and the like.  
Firms invest resources in deterring employee crime (and encouraging effort), with 
accounting systems and hidden cameras.  Many companies try to instill identification 
with the company, so as to achieve both goals.  Konrad (2008) argues that, similarly, 
countries must make decisions about how many resources to invest in instilling 
identification with the country, what he refers to as patriotism, in order to increase tax 
compliance.    
Of course, government has much more power than any other organization, and thus 
the psychological attitudes of individuals toward them might be fundamentally different 
than toward other organizations.  Individuals might feel more dutiful and even obedient 
toward government.  Invocation of the word obedience, though, invokes a darker side of 
the relationship between individuals and government as an authority figure.  I am 
speaking of the controversial, indeed notorious, experiments conducted by the Yale 
University psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963), which showed that unwitting subjects 
were willing to deliver what they thought were substantial electric shocks when 
instructed to, and encouraged to, by authority figures.   
Before concluding, it is interesting to note that complexity and compliance are not 
completely independent concerns.  It may be that a tax system is so complex that it is not 
worth the taxpayer’s time and expense to accurately calculate tax liability.  In that case, 
there will be more capriciousness in the assignment of tax burden, but the errors should 
be symmetric.  It may also be that complexity engenders a particular strong negative 
assessment of the government and the tax process, which overcomes the free-rider 
calculus and leads to noncompliance.  On the other hand, Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989) 
suggest that uncertainty about true tax liability may in some settings cause risk-averse 
taxpayers to be less aggressive than otherwise in their tax reporting behavior. 
 
4.  Final Thoughts 
In this essay I have offered some observations about what insights behavioral 
economics can bring to bear on the issues of tax complexity and tax compliance. 
I ponder why the government, in the words of the epigraph, is often “singing and 
dancing”—presenting taxpayers with a tax system of cacophonic complexity.  In part it   15
may be, as the epigraph’s author Chuck Palahniuk suggests, to distract taxpayers from the 
magnitude of the tax burden imposed or to reward those who can manage and even profit 
from the complexity.  After all, firms operating in competitive markets have discovered 
that this can be a profitable strategy, and the constraints of political markets are likely to 
be smaller. It is, though, these same taxpayers in their role as voters that help set the tax 
system and its level of complexity, marking a difference between government and Procter 
& Gamble offering coupons it knows most buyers never cash in.  In an environment of 
complicated tax systems and differing opinions among economists about the ultimate 
consequences of even simple tax systems, we must ask who is fooling whom. 
Governments and firms differ in another important way.  Most firms are selling 
private goods and therefore can, instances of theft notwithstanding, generally withhold 
their product absent payment.  Governments are in part offering non-excludable services, 
and so must rely on remittances that are either made dutifully or “encouraged” by an 
enforcement system based on withholding, information reporting, and audits backed by 
penalties for noncompliance.
14  Behavioral economics, largely observing the results of 
laboratory experiments, has shown that some people will deviate in some situations from 
the choices that would seem appropriate for rational, purely self-interested individuals.  
For example, their decisions depend on the perceived reciprocity or intentionality of 
those they interact with, as well as their perceived meanness or kindness.  But by their 
nature laboratory experiments involve the decisions of individuals interacting with other 
individuals, or perhaps a random-number-generating computer, and not with a largely 
impersonal government or its tax agency, an authority figure imbued with a rich and 
complicated history.  Field experiments offer more promise for capturing how real people 
react to real policy changes made by real governments, although they come with their 
own limitations. 
                                                 
14 Another part of what government does is effect transfers from one group to another.  This suggests that 
lobbyists, along with legislators, might work together to contribute to tax complexity, and that the objective 
is not only to reduce the perceived average burden of taxation but also to obfuscate the distribution of that 
burden.  This raises the issue of the cognitive biases and limitations of the lobbyists and the interests they 
represent.  Slemrod (2008b) argues that business associations’ positions on tax reform often make 
arbitrarily simple and internally inconsistent assumptions about incidence, especially by distinguishing 
between “business taxes” (presumed to negatively affect the return to business operations) and non-
business taxes (not likely to do so) that are subject to the framing of the taxes and the remittance system 
(i.e., who “writes the check” to the tax authority).   16
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